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ABSTRACT 
The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints   
by Kai A. Konrad and Dan Kovenock 
The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a 
collective action problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show 
that budget constraints of an intermediate size can overcome this strong 
disadvantage and explain the formation of alliances. 
 
Keywords: Alliance formation puzzle, military conflict, budget constraints  
JEL Classification: D72, D74 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Rolle von Kapazitätsgrenzen für die Vorteilhaftigkeit von Allianzen 
Die Bildung von Allianzen in Konfliktsituationen induziert zwei Probleme: 
Partner in einer Allianz stehen vor dem Problem kollektiven Handelns, insofern 
ihr eigener Beitrag zum Erfolg der Allianz auch den anderen Allianzmitgliedern 
zu Gute kommt. Zudem entsteht innerhalb der Allianz ein Konflikt über die 
Aufteilung dessen, was die Allianz gewinnt. Das wirft die Frage auf, weshalb 
Allianzen überhaupt gebildet werden. In dieser Arbeit zeigen die Autoren, dass 
Budgetbeschränkungen mittlerer Größe es ermöglichen, beide Probleme zu 
überwinden und die Bildung von Allianzen Vorteile für alle Allianzmitglieder ent-
stehen können. Dies liefert eine Erklärung von Allianzen in Konfliktsituationen. 
1 Introduction
The formation of an alliance constitutes a puzzle. Alliances are very common
in many applications that constitute contests or tournaments, including mil-
itary conflict, R&D tournaments, lobbying and political campaigning. But,
as shown by Esteban and Sákovics (2003), alliance formation involves severe
strategic disadvantages that make them undesirable under a wide range of
circumstances if the members of the alliance can join and coordinate their ef-
forts when fighting against an external enemy, but behave non-cooperatively
vis-a-vis each other.1 First, the alliance as a group faces a collective action
problem. Second, once an alliance wins the conflict against a joint enemy,
peace inside the alliance may end and the members of the alliance may
turn against each other.2 The anticipated cost of this internal conflict also
makes alliance formation less attractive. We show that capacity constraints
on eﬀort can make such a non-cooperative alliance between equal alliance
members profitable for its members, compared to the grand contest in which
all players compete simultaneously in one single stage.
2 The alliance formation puzzle
Consider a set of three players N = {A,B,C} who contest for a prize that
is valued equally by all three players, and normalize this value to 1. The
1Other analyses of alliance formation focussing on diﬀerent aspects are Skaperdas
(1998), Garfinkel (2004) and Kovenock and Roberson (2007).
2Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) and Wärneryd (1998) address the problem of internal
conflict that may emerge inside an alliance that is victorious in the contest with another
group, and analyse this nested structure in the context of a Tullock contest. To illustrate
the structure with an example, consider the alliance between the USA and Russia during
World War II. The alliance was seemingly useful for the Allied Forces in their goal of
defeating Nazi Germany and its coalition. However, when the end of the war came closer,
a divergence of interests among the Allied Forces became visible. It was not diﬃcult
to anticipate that the alliance would break up after the defeat of Germany and that a
conflict between the two large victorious countries would emerge. Rational players may
therefore have anticipated what is now known as the Cold War. From this perspective,
the conferences that took place prior to the termination of the war (e.g., the Moskow
Conference, October 1944, and the Yalta Conference, February 1945) can be seen as
attempts to reach an agreement regarding the division of the gains of winning the war.
Part of the agreement, for instance, was the division of the defeated region into spheres
of influence. As is well-known now, these attempts have not been very successful. The
agreements were not time consistent. They did not solve the fundamental conflict and
competition about the future social and economic world order and political dominance.
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players B and C may form an alliance against player A.3 Once the alliance
has formed, two groups {A} and {B,C} contest with each other in an all-
pay auction without noise as characterized by Hillman and Riley (1989) and
Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996). Let the eﬀort choices of A, B and
C in this inter-group contest (stage 1) be xA ∈ [0,mA], xB ∈ [0,mB] and
xC ∈ [0,mC ], where mA, mB and mC describe the maximum eﬀort that
can be mobilized at this stage, due to some capacity constraints. Assume
further that the eﬀorts of alliance members add up to the eﬀort xB+xC of the
alliance. The probability that A wins is p{A} = 1 if xA > xB +xC , p{A} = 0
if xA < xB + xC , and p{A} = 1/2 if xA = xB + xC , and p{B,C} = 1− p{A}.
The game ends if player A wins this contest and receives the prize. If
the alliance {B,C} wins, the two alliance members need to determine how
the prize is shared between them. Due to the lack of enforceable contracts
between B and C the two allies will themselves enter into a distributional
conflict (stage 2). They simultaneously choose conflict eﬀort yB ∈ [0,mB]
and yC ∈ [0,mC ], or random distributions described by cumulative distri-
bution functions GB and GC on these intervals, and win probabilities are
pB = 1 if yB > yC , pB = 0 if yB < yC , and pB = 1/2 if yB = yC . Each
player’s payoﬀ is equal to his probability of winning the prize, minus the
player’s own cost of contest eﬀort(s), i.e.,
πA = p{A} − xA
πB = (1− p{A})pB − xB − yB
πC = (1− p{A})pC − xC − yC .
(1)
We examine an extended game in which eﬀort choices in stage 1 also occur
simultaneously. {A} chooses xA or a mixed strategy described by a cumula-
tive distribution function F{A}. The members of the alliance may correlate
their choices by observing the draw z from a random variable that has a
cumulative distribution function4
FZ(z) =
½
z for z ∈ [0,mA)
1 for z ≥ mA
(2)
They choose their eﬀorts xB and xC independently from each other and may
make their choices dependent on z. Instead of pure strategies xi(z) ∈ [0,mi]
3Alliance formation is typically a voluntary process. Describing this endogeneity is a
diﬀerent and diﬃcult problem.
4See Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) who introduce the concept of an extended game
with public randomization to restore existence of equilibrium in continuous games with
almost perfect information. In our game only the members of the alliance observe the
realization of z.
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players i ∈ {B,C} may also choose cumulative distribution functions Fi as
functions of z. When choosing their eﬀorts, B and C individually maximize
their individual payoﬀs, respectively.
Proposition 1 Let B and C form an alliance. Let mB = mC ≡ m ∈
(mA2 ,
1
2 −
mA
2 ). Then a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended game
exists with πA = 0, πB + πC = 1−mA − 2m.
Proof. Consider stage 2. If {A} was the winner of the inter-group contest,
A receives the full prize, without further fighting. If {B,C} wins the prize in
stage 1, B and C fight over the distribution of the prize in an all-pay auction.
Their eﬀort choices are yB and yC , with yi ∈ [0,m] for i ∈ {B,C}. The
solution of this contest depends on the size of m. Since m ≤ 12 −
mA
2 < 1/2,
both B and C expend the maximum eﬀort in the unique equilibrium of this
subgame, each wins with a probability of 1/2, and each has a payoﬀ from
participating in this subgame of v ≡ 12 −m > 0.
Turning to stage 1, consider the following eﬀort choices as a candidate
equilibrium: Let xB(z) = xC(z) = z2 . Further, let player A choose a mixed
strategy
F{A}(xA) =
½ v−mA
v +
xA
v for xA ∈ [0,mA]
1 for xA > mA.
(3)
We show that, given the equilibrium play in the subgame in stage 2, these
eﬀort choices constitute optimal replies vis-a-vis each other.
Consider first A. This player anticipates that the joint eﬀort x = xB+xC
of B and C is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function
F{B,C}(x) =
½
x for x ∈ (0,mA)
1 for x ≥ mA.
(4)
Hence, his payoﬀ from choosing xA is xA · 1− xA = 0 for xA ∈ [0,mA), and
mA
1 · 12 −mA ≤ 0 for xA = mA. This makes A indiﬀerent as regards the
choice of xA ∈ [0,mA), and makes FA(xA) in (3) an optimal reply.
Consider now B. This player attributes the value v = 12 −m to a victory
of the alliance in stage 1. Observing z and taking the probability FA(x) that
xA ≤ x in (3) and xC = z/2 as given, B maximizes
πB(xB;xC =
z
2
) =
½
(v−mAv +
xB+z/2
v )v − xB for xB ∈ [0,mA −
z
2 ]
v − xB for xB ∈ [mA − z2 ,mB].
(5)
As (v−mAv +
xB+z/2
v )v−xB = v−mA+
z
2 , any xB ∈ [0,mA−
z
2 ] is maximizing
this πB(xB); this makes xB(z) = z/2 an optimal reply. The proof for why
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xC(z) = z/2 is an optimal reply for C is fully analogous. Moreover, if
xB(z) = xC(z) = z/2, this together with FZ generates (4).
The contest problem combines the all-pay auction problem with diﬀerent
budget limits as in Che and Gale (1997) with a collective action problem in
stage 1 and a potential all-pay auction in stage 2.5 In the equilibrium the
members of the alliance are able to overcome the collective action problem
in stage 1, using perfectly correlated strategies. The solution requires a
randomization device that is observable for B and C, but not for A. For
simplicity, we assumed that this device is exogenously given to the alliance.
Our result constrasts with the findings in Esteban and Sákovics (2003).
They consider a structurally very similar nested conflict, with a Tullock
contest success function, instead of perfect discrimination without noise.
Also, they allow for convex costs of eﬀort for each player, and their players
are not capacity constrained. They find that the payoﬀs of the members
of the alliance are lower and the payoﬀ of the single player is higher than
if all three players compete in a single-stage Tullock contest. We find the
opposite. If A,B and C contest in a single-stage all-pay auction without
noise and have capacity constraints mA > mB = mC ≡ m, an equilibrium
has πA = mA−m > 0, and πB = πC = 0. This shows that alliance formation
can benefit the players who form the alliance and harm the player who is
not a member of the alliance.
The specific choice of budget limits in this example is not arbitrary. First,
consider the role of m ∈ (mA2 ,
1
2 −
mA
2 ) for this result. If m <
mA
2 , then, by
a choice of xA = 2m + , player A can guarantee himself a payoﬀ that is
arbitrarily close to 1−2m, and of 1−m in a game without alliance formation.
Second, A is given a larger budget than B and C, so that alliance formation
allows for higher joint eﬀorts by B and C than A’s maximum eﬀort. To
overbid A’s maximum eﬀort was infeasible if players B and C stayed alone.
Given mA > mB = mC = m, the equilibrium outcome of a three-player
"playing the field" all-pay auction without noise led to equilibrium payoﬀs
πA = 1−m, and πB = πC = 0.
Third,mB = mC has been chosen in order to avoid giving B or C a strict
advantage in the intra-group conflict in stage 2. If mB > mC , then B and
C face a more diﬃcult collective action problem, as B can outbid C in the
intra-alliance contest in stage 2. In turn, this causes vB = 1−mC and vC = 0
and this would prevent C from contributing in the inter-group contest. This
5A similar equilibrium with correlated eﬀorts, but without budget constraits is analysed
in Konrad and Leininger (2007). However, they use multiplicity of subgames in later stages
and the threat of deviating to an inferior equilibrium to enforce high collective eﬀorts. In
our context, the equilibrium eﬀorts are self-enforced without such threats.
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problem regarding mB 6= mC should not be taken too literally. First, if one
assumes a contest success function with noise in stage 2, a small diﬀerence
in budgets does not change the results qualitatively. Second, if B’s and C’s
budgets are not certain, but uncertain and drawn from a distribution at the
beginning of stage 2, then the strong hold-up that is generated by mB 6= mC
also disappears. Third, and more strictly within our framework with given
and known mB and mC and an all-pay auction without noise in stage 2,
if B and C correctly anticipate the incentive problems this implies, they
might be able to make a transfer of capacity between them in stage 1 and
have an option to influence the eﬀort limits they have available in both the
inter-group conflict and in the intra-alliance conflict, so that B and C can
escape from the hold-up from mB 6= mC in this way, again making the the
outcome underlying Proposition 1 an equilibrium.
3 Conclusions
If players would like to expend more than their budget in an all-pay auction,
the player who has a higher budget than his competitor can make a bid that
is slightly higher than his competitor’s budget, and guarantee a victory.
An alliance may increase the range of possible eﬀort, compared to players’
options in a stand alone situation. The formation of an alliance may allow
the group to outbid budget constrained competitors. This is an advantage
from joining forces. On the other hand, in the literature alliances have
been seen as being very detrimental to its members because of the later
conflict between these members. With suﬃciently low budget or capacity
constraints, however, the strategic disadvantage is more than outweighed
by the increase in competitive strength of the alliance. Capacity constraints
also allow the alliance to overcome the collective action problem. Hence, the
beneficial budget enlargement eﬀect of forming an alliance may outweigh the
potentially harmful strategic eﬀects. For this to happen, the alliance needs
to be suﬃciently strong, but not too strong.
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